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EXPANDING PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT UNDER THE RECORD
RENTAL AMENDMENT BEYOND THE MUSIC INDUSTRY
by
Ryan Vacca·
This Article explores the development of copyright law's first sale
doctrine and the Record Rental Amendment (RRA) in light of the Sixth
Circuit's interpretation of the RRA in Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights
Cross Communications, Inc. This Article does not take issue with the
court's conclusion, but instead uses the differing conclusions of the
majority and dissent to illustrate that the RRA exception is in need of
Congressional clarification. This Article also examines whether the
Record Rental Amendment should be amended to include audiobooks and
other non-musical works, concluding that they should. The author then
proposes two alternative amendments to the RRA; one to expand its
scope to cover non-musical phonorecords, and one to clarify that it does
not.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In January 2007, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Brilliance
1
Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Communications, Inc. and answered a lingering
question concerning the Copyright Act that had persisted for over twenty years.
The court decided whether the protections offered to the music industry under
the poorly drafted Record Rental Amendment of 1984 (Act) also extended to
audiobooks. 2 This Act deprives owners of tapes and compact discs from renting
those items to others without the consent of the copyright owners of the
recorded song and the written lyrics and music-a right historically granted to
all purchasers of books, magazines, albums, tapes, and compact disks under the
first sale doctrine.
Ultimately, the court held the protections ~anted by the Record Rental
Amendment were limited to the music industry. However, both the majority
and vigorous dissenting opinions highlighted the differing interpretations of the
Act's applicability and set the stage for a circuit split.
This Article explores the text and historical developments of copyright
law's first sale doctrine and the Record Rental Amendment and how the Sixth
Circuit interpreted it. Moreover, this Article examines whether the Record
Rental Amendment should be amended to include audiobooks and other non
musical works and ultimately suggests two alternative amendments Congress
should adopt to resolve future conflicts and avoid a split amongst the circuits.
II.

A.

COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE

The Exclusive Right to Distribute

The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution grants Congress the
power "To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.'.4 Consistent with this power, Congress has, over the
I
2
3

4

474 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 368.
Id. at 374.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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years, adopted a series of Copyright Acts. 5 Today, the Copyright Act provides
copyright owners with several exclusive rights, 6 including the right "to
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending."7
Before discussing what this right entails, a couple terms must be defined.
"Phonorecords" are defined as "material objects in which sounds, other than
those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, 8 are fixed by
any method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device." 9 Phonorecords include the material object in
which the sounds are first fixed. 10 Examples of phonorecords are compact discs
("CDs"), tapes, and vinyl albums.
"Copies" are defined as "material objects, other than phonorecords, in
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 11 Copies include "the
material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work is first fixed." 12
Examples of a copy would be a book containing a copyrighted story and a
magazine or newspaper containing a copyrighted article. For our purposes, the
only difference is phonorecords apply to sounds while copies apply to
everything else.
Thus, the exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords to the public
means the copyright owner of a song or story can sell a CD or book containing
5

See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:1.1-7 (Thomson West 2007)
(noting Congress created the initial copyright act in 1790 and made omnibus revisions in
1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976).
6
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000), which grants to copyright owners the rights:
( 1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means
of a digital audio transmission.
7
Id. § 106(3).
8
Audiovisual works are defined as:
works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be
shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic
equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the
material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.
17 U .S.C. § I 01 (2000).
9
Id.
IO Id.
II

Id.

12

Id.

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

608

[Vol.11:3

the song or story and has the power to exclude others from engaging in these
activities. 13 Although the right to distribute applies to copies and phonorecords,
this Article is primarily concerned with the distribution of phonorecords.

B.

The First Sale Doctrine: An Exception to Exclusivity

Although the Copyright Act purports to grant copyright owners the
exclusive right to distribute phonorecords and copies of their works, this
exclusive right is not without bounds. The first sale doctrine is an exception
restricting this exclusive distribution right. It attempts to balance the rights of
copyright owners with the rights of purchasers of phonorecords and copies.

The First Sale Doctrine in its Current Fonn
In general, the first sale doctrine provides that once the copyright owner
has transferred ownership of a particular phonorecord or copy, the new owner
can redistribute by resale, rental, or loan, that copy without the consent of the
copyright owner and without infringing the copyright owner's exclusive right
14
of distribution. The doctrine is codified in section 109(a) of the 1976
15
Copyright Act. Section 109(a) states, in relevant part:
1.

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [the exclusive right to
publicly distribute], the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord
lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is
entitled, without the authority ofthe copyright owner, to sell or otherwise
16
dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
In other words, once a consumer buys a phonorecord or copy, the
copyright owner's permission is unnecessary for the consumer to sell, trade, or
otherwise dispose of that phonorecord or copy. 17 The consumer is, in effect,
authorized to distribute that particular phonorecord or copy. It is important to
note that under section 109(a), the consumer is only exempted from the
exclusive right to distribute. The same is not true for the other exclusive rights
granted by the Copyright Act. 18 It is also worth noting that although named the
"first sale doctrine," the disposition of the phonorecord or copy may be made

13

MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT§ 8.l l[A] (Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc. 2006) [hereinafter NIMMER].
14
Judith K. Smith, The Computer Software Rental Act: Amending the 'First Sale
Doctrine' to Protect Computer Software Copyright, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1613, 1624
(1987).
15
The Copyright Act does permit a purchaser of a copy to publicly display that copy
without violating the copyright owner's exclusive right to publicly display the copyrighted
work. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2000).
16
Id.§ 109(a)(emphasis added).
17
Cary T. Platkin, In Search of a Compromise to the Music Industry's Used CD
Dilemma, 29 U.S.F. L. REv. 509, 514-15 (1995).
18
NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[D] (citing Design Options, Inc. v. BellePointe, Inc.,
940 F. Supp. 86, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (reproduction); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F.
Supp. 741, 745 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (adaptation); and Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd
Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 1984) (performance)). But see supra note 15
(discussing the right to publicly display a copy).
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by gift, devise, or operation of Jaw without upsetting the legal effect of the
19
doctrine.
If, on the other hand, the copyright owner does not whoJJy divest itself of
title in the phonorecord or copy embodying the copyrighted work (e.g. the song
or the story), then the first sale doctrine is inapplicable. For example, if the
copyright owner leased the phonorecord or copy, then the Jessee would infringe
the copyright owner's distribution right if, without the copyright owner's
consent, the Jessee sold, leased, or lent the phonorecord or copy to another. 20
Therefore, if I write a song, record myself singing it, put this recording on a CD
(a phonorecord), lend it to you, and you in turn seJI it on eBay, then you wiJI
have not only unlawfuJJy sold my CD, you wiJI have also committed copyright
infringement by exercising my exclusive right to distribute my song. Thus,
"mere authorized possession of a [phonorecord or copy], if title in the tangible
[phonorecord or copy] does not pass to the possessor, does not trigger the
limitation of Section 109(a), and hence does not affect the copyright owner's
rights under Section 106(3)." 21 Under the same line of reasoning, licensing a
22
phonorecord or copy is also not covered under the first sale doctrine.
2. The Historical Development ofthe First Sale Doctrine
Reviewing the genesis and historical development of the first sale doctrine
is useful in understanding its original purpose and continued validity. The first
sale doctrine's origin is confused at best. Some have linked the doctrine to the
Sherman Act's prohibition against restraints on trade. 23 Others argue it derives
from the English common Jaw rules disapproving of restraints on the alienation
of property as this was viewed as elemental to ownership. 24 In 1907, the Sixth
Circuit, commenting on restrictions upon sales and resales, stated:

A prime objection to the enforceability of such a system of restraint upon
sales and prices is that they offend against the ordinary and usual
freedom of traffic in chattels or articles which pass by mere delivery. The
right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general
property in movables, and restraints upon alienation have been generally

19

John M. Kernochan, The Distribution Right in the United States ofAmerica: Review
and Reflections, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1407, 1410 (1989); NIMMER, supra note 13,
§ 8.12[B][l][a]. See also Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 477 F.3d 128,
142-43 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that entry of judgment in a copyright infringement suit
transforms a copy from unlawful to lawful for purposes of the first sale doctrine).
20
NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B][l][a] (citing Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve
Corp., 220 U.S.P.Q. 170, 1983 WL 1147 (W.D. Tex. 1983)).
21 Id.
22
Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208, 212-13
(E.D.N.Y. 1994); !SC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1314 (N.D.
Ill. 1990).
23
Sharon Billington, Relieffrom Online Used Book Sales During New Book Launches,
29 COLUM. J.L. &ARTS 497, 512 (2006).
24
Kernochan, supra note 19, at 1412; David H. Horowitz, The Record Rental
Amendment of 1984: A Case Study in the Effort to Adapt Copyright Law to New Technology,
12 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. &ARTS 31 (1987).
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regarded as obnoxious to public policy, which is best subserved by great
freedom of traffic in such things as pass from hand to hand. 25
Two related socioeconomic arguments have also been put forth. One is
that the first sale doctrine permits access to works where the copyright owner
26
might otherwise suppress the information. The second is the doctrine "creates
secondary markets, which lead to more affordable used versions of copyrighted
works and helps to serve members of the public who lack the means or
27
opportunity to buy the items new."
Some commentators identify the Supreme Court's 1908 decision Bobbs
Merrill Co. v. Straus2 8 as the origin of the first sale doctrine under U.S.
29
copyright law. However, earlier precedent for the first sale doctrine existed at
30
least as far back as 1894. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Bobbs-Merrill lays
a strong foundation for the historical discussion of the first sale doctrine.
In Bobbs-Merrill, the plaintiff was the copyright owner of a novel entitled
The Castaway. 31 One of the initial pages of the book contained a notice: "The
price of this book at retail is one dollar. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less
price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the
32
copyright."
The defendant purchased copies of The Castaway from
wholesalers and, with knowledge of the notice, sold copies at the retail level for
eighty-nine cents without the consent of the plaintiff. 33 The plaintiff sued
arguing the defendant infringed upon the plaintiffs exclusive right to "vend"
34
by selling The Castaway at less than one dollar per copy. The Court rejected
this argument and held:
To add to the right of exclusive sale the authority to control all future
retail sales ... would give a right not included in the terms of the statute,
and, in our view, extend its operation, by construction, beyond its
meaning, when interpreted with a view to ascertaining the legislative
intent in its enactment. 35

25

John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907).
Billington, supra note 23, at 508.
21 Id.
28
210 U.S. 339 (1908).
29
See Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1449, 1470
(2004); Platkin, supra note 17, at 515-16.
30
See Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689 (2d Cir. 1894). For a thorough
examination of the historical analysis of the first sale doctrine, including its relationship with
copyright, antitrust, and patent cases, see Billington, supra note 23, at 512-24.
31
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 341.
32 Id.
33
Id. at 341-42.
34
The Copyright Act in effect in 1908 granted copyright owners the "sole liberty of
printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing, and vending." See
id at 348.
35
Id. at 351.
26
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Interestingly, the Court in Bobbs-Merrill appeared to base its decision merely
on the statutory language of the Copyright Act and did not articulate a policy
basis for this reading. 36
In 1909, a year after Bobbs-Merrill was decided, Congress revised the
Copyright Act and, for the first time, codified the first sale doctrine. 37 Section
27 of the 1909 Copyright Act provided:
The copyright is distinct from the property in the material object
copyrighted, and the sale or conveyance, by gift or otherwise, of the
material object shall not of itself constitute a transfer of the copyright,
nor shall the assignment of the copyright constitute a transfer of the title
to the material object; but nothing in this title shall be deemed to forbid,
prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the
possession of which has been lawfully obtained. 38
Like the Court in Bobbs-Merrill, Congress indicated no policy basis in
either the statute or the legislative history to show why the first sale doctrine
was advisable. 39 The most illuminating comment is in the House Report on the
1909 Act explaining, "it would be most unwise to permit the copyright
proprietor to exercise any control whatever over the article which is the subject
of copyright after said proprietor has made the first sale."40
The next major revision to the Copyright Act occurred in 1976, which
codified the first sale doctrine in section 109(a). 41 This reaffirmation of the first
sale doctrine originally read:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any
person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that
copy or phonorecord. 42
This codification of the first sale doctrine is similar, but not identical to
section 27 of the 1909 Copyright Act. 43 In particular, it reflected the distinction
drawn between the definitions of copies and phonorecords. Nonetheless, it is
clear Congress was merely confirming the principle and not substantively
. . 44
changmg it.
36

Robinson, supra note 29, at 1470. For an interesting discussion about the case
history of Bobbs-Merrill and the associated antitrust litigation, see Billington, supra note 23,
at 519-22.
37
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075.
38
17 U.S.C. § 27 (1946 & Supp. III 1950). The copyright laws were codified as Title
17 of the United States Code in 1947 and the first sale doctrine was renumbered section 27.
See Platkin, supra note 17, at 516 n.45.
39
Robinson, supra note 29, at 1471.
40
H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 19 (1909).
41
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1976).
42 Id.
43
NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B].
44
The House Report for section 109 indicates that:
[Section I09(a)] restates and confirms the principle that, where the copyright owner has
transferred ownership of a particular copy or phonorecord of a work, the person to
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III. THE RECORD RENT AL AMENDMENT: AN EXCEPTION TO THE
EXCEPTION

A.

The Historical Context

Soon after the 1976 Copyright Act was passed, the record industry began
to lobby Congress for an exception to the first sale doctrine. 45 In the early
1980s, the Japanese record rental business was booming. 46 By 1983, there were
more than 1,600 rental shops. 47 In a survey conducted in Japan, over ninety
seven percent of rental customers stated they made home recordings of the
records they rented. 48 Furthermore, more than sixty-one percent of those
customers loaned or gave copied tapes to others, thus further expanding the
number of phonorecords generated by rented albums. 49 As a result of this
widespread rental market, retail sales for records plummeted thirty percent. 50
The success of record rental businesses began spreading to other countries and
hit the United States in September 1981, in Providence, Rhode Island. 51
The record industry complained that the record rental business was a
growing phenomenon and piracy threatened enormous financial losses. 52 As a
result of this threat, the record industry argued, "[T]he quantity and diversity of
new musical releases available to consumers [would] diminish" and "prices of
prerecorded discs and tapes [would] likely ... be forced upward." 53
Of additional concern to the record industry was the introduction of the
CD. The CD not only provided better sound quality than a record, "it was not
subject to the wear and tear and consequent degradation of listening quality
whom the copy or phonorecord is transferred is entitled to dispose of it by sale, rental,
or any other means. Under this principle, which has been established by the court
decisions and section 27 of the present law, the copyright owner's exclusive right of
public distribution would have no effect upon anyone who owns "a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title" and who wishes to transfer it to someone
else or to destroy it.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 79 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693. Section
109(a) was again amended in 1994 pursuant to the Uruguay Round Agreements Act and
added a second sentence to address works of foreign origin resurrected from the United
States' public domain. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B]; see also Act of Dec. 8, 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-465, § 514(b), 108 Stat. 4809. The 1994 amendment is beyond the scope of this
Article and irrelevant for this discussion; as such, it is sufficient to note that the codification
of the first sale doctrine today is identical to that of 1976.
45
Platkin, supra note 17, at 51 7.
46
Horowitz, supra note 24, at 32.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51

Id. at 33.
Smith, supra note 14, at 1636.
53
Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine: Hearings on H.R. 1027, H.R. 1029 and S. 32
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 19-20 ( 1985) (joint statement of AGAC/The
Songwriters Guild, the National Association of Recording Merchandisers, The National
Music Publishers' Association and The Record Industry Association of America).
52
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experienced with [records]."54 This new technology supplemented the record
industry's fear that what happened in Japan with records would occur in the
United States, but at an increased level.
In 1983, at the record industry's urging, Congress examined the impact of
phonorecord rentals. 55 From its investigation, Congress learned that record
stores were renting phonorecords for twenty-four to seventy-two hour time
periods for fees of 99¢ to $2.50 fer phonorecord while selling blank audio
cassette tapes at the same time. 5 "It was obvious that virtually everyone
obtaining phonorecords by rental did so for the sole purpose of making audio
tape reproductions of the rented material." 57 In fact, one of the nearly two
hundred commercial record rental stores advertised "NEVER, EVER BUY
ANOTHER RECORD." 58 Another simply stated "SAVE MONEY, RENT
ANY LP OR 45, TAKE IT HOME PUT IT ONTAPE AND RETURN IT."59
Congress was persuaded. Despite nearly a century of the first sale doctrine
remaining largely undisturbed, Congress made a drastic change in 1984, which
created an exception to the first sale doctrine (i.e. an exception to the exception
to exclusivi~). The exception was the Record Rental Amendment (the "RRA
exception"). 0
B.

Section 109(b)(l)(A)

The current version of section 109(b)(l)(A) of the Copyright Act, which
codified the RRA exception, states in relevant part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) [the first sale doctrine],
unless authorized by the owners of copyright in the sound recording or
the owner of copyright in a computer program (including any tape, disk,
or other medium embodying such program), and in the case of a sound
recording in the musical works embodied therein, neither the owner of a
particular phonorecord nor any person in possession of a particular copy
of a computer program (including any tape, disk, or other medium
embodying such program), may, for the purposes of direct or indirect
commercial advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the
possession of that phonorecord or computer program (including any tape,
disk, or other medium embodying such program) by rental, lease, or
54

Horowitz, supra note 24, at 33.
Lawrence J. Glusman, It's My Copy, Right? Music Industry Power to Control
Growing Resale Markets in Used Digital Audio Recordings, 1995 WIS. L. REv. 709, 720
(1995).
56
H.R. REP. No. 98-987, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2899;
NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B][7].
57
NIMMER, supra note 13, at§ 8.12[B][7].
58
H.R. REP. No. 98-987, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2899.
59
Horowitz, supra note 24, at 33, citing Audio and Video First Sale Doctrine:
Hearings on H.R. 1027, H.R. 1029, S. 31 98th Cong. 31 (1983-84) (joint statement of
AGAC/The Songwriters Guild, The National Association of Recording Merchandisers, The
National Music Publishers' Association and the Recording Industry of America).
60
Record Rental Amendment Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (codified
at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(J) (1984)). For a complete history of the Record Rental Amendment
of 1984, see generally Horowitz, supra note 24.
55
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lending, or by any other act or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or

. 61
Ien dmg.

Much of the verbosity of this sentence was added by the Computer
62
Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990. Prior to this amendment, the RRA
exception read, in relevant part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) [the first sale doctrine],
unless authorized by the owners of copyright in the sound recording and
in the musical works embodied therein, the owner of a particular
phonorecord may not, for purposes of direct or indirect commercial
advantage dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the possession of that
phonorecord by rental, lease, or lendinfo, or by any other act or practice in
the nature ofrental, lease, or lending. 6
A few comments about the boundaries of the RRA exception are necessary
before applying it to the problem raised in this Article.
First, a discussion of sound recordings and musical works is helpful. The
Copyright Act defines sound recordings as "works that result from the fixation
of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the
nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in
which they are embodied."64 In other words, except for soundtracks and sounds
accompanying audiovisual works, 65 sound recordings are the audible parts of a
copyrighted work; this is in contrast to the written part of the copyrighted work.
The Copyright Act does not define the term "musical works," but this generally
refers to the tangible expression that may later be used to create a sound
recording. An example may clarify the meaning of these terms. When a
songwriter writes lyrics or prepares the written music for song, this would be
considered the musical work and is entitled to copyright protection. If the
songwriter then goes to the studio to record the song, the result is a sound
recording (i.e. what you hear on the radio). As described supra, the sound
recording will be embodied in a phonorecord, such as a CD. 66 But sound
recordings are not limited to those based upon musical works. As noted in the
definition of sound recordings, these sounds can also include spoken words or

61

17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(l)(A) (2000).
Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(l)
(1990)). This act added computer software to the items partially exempted from the first sale
doctrine. Much has been written on this topic, but is beyond the scope of this Article. For
additional information see NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B][8]. For the sake of
completeness, it should be noted that section 109(b) also contains a limited exception for
nonprofit libraries. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2)(A) (2000). This nonprofit library exception is
really an exception to the exception to the exception to exclusivity.
63
Record Rental Amendment Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (codified
at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(l)).
64
17 U .S.C. § I 0 I (2000).
65
See supra note 8 for the definition of"audiovisual works."
66
See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
62
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other sounds. 67 An example of a sound recording not containing musical works
is an audiobook. 68
Second, and as a corollary to the first point, it should be noted that there
are two potential consents that must be obtained. One is from the copyright
owner of the sound recording. The other is from the copyright owner of the
musical work. Although these may be the same person, they can be, and often
are, different. Thus, if I write a song and you record it with my permission,69
then someone wishing to rent the CD with your recording would need both of
our consents.
Third, the RRA exception only limits the first sale doctrine as it pertains to
renting, leasing, lending, or "any other act or practice in the nature of rental,
lease, or lending."70 Purchasers of phonorecords are free to sell their
phonorecord pursuant to the first sale doctrine without fear of infringing the
copyright owner's exclusive right to distribute. 71
Fourth, it should be noted that the RRA exception only applies to
phonorecords and not copies. 72 As noted supra, phonorecords are the material
objects embodying sounds, whereas copies, in essence, embody everything
else. 73 Sheet music would be an example of a copy. Therefore, the purchaser of
sheet music would be permitted to rent, lease, or lend the sheet music to others
pursuant to the first sale doctrine without running afoul of the RRA exception.
Fifth, the RRA exception only forbids renting, leasing, lending, and the
like if done "for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage." 74
Although not in the context of the RRA exception, this phrase has been
interpreted in reference to other sections of the Copyright Act to mean "for
profit."75 Thus, one who simply lends a phonorecord to a friend and does not
charge would not fall within the ambit of the RRA exception.

67

17 U.S.C. § 101.
Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Communications, Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 368
(6th Cir. 2007).
69
My permission is needed because I have the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works from my written song, such as a sound recording thereof. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
70
Id. § 109(b)(l)(A). The "any other act or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or
lending" language used in the RRA exception was intended "to cover transactions which
common sense indicates are equivalent to rentals, but which may be disguised in an attempt
to avoid liability under the law." H.R. REP. No. 98-987, at 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2901. The House Report gives the following example:
[A] retailer who "sold" an album to be "bought back" a few days later, or a club
organized to lend records to its members who paid a membership fee rather than a
direct rental fee, would be performing acts or practices in the nature of rental, lease, or
lending and would be in violation of the law unless permission of the copyright owners
had been obtained.
71
See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a); NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B][7][a].
72
NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B][7][a].
73
See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
74
17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(l)(A).
75
NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B][7][b].
68
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With these boundaries of the RRA exception established, it is clear that
one who purchases a CD containing music may not rent, lease, or lend it out for
commercial advantage without securing the proper consents.
IV. IS THE RECORD RENTAL AMENDMENT EXCEPTION LIMITED TO
MUSICAL PHONORECORDS?

Although the RRA exception clearly prevents the renting, leasing, or
lending of musical phonorecords, 76 a question remains as to its applicability to
non-musical phonorecords, such as audiobooks or stand-up comedy albums.
This precise question was recently addressed as a matter of first impression by
the Sixth Circuit in Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Communications,
Inc. and led to a split opinion by the panel. 77
In Brilliance Audio, the plaintiff was in the business of producing and
selling audiobooks. 7s The plaintiff had exclusive agreements with publishers
and authors to prepare sound recordings based on literary works. 79 As a result,
the plaintiff owned copyrights in the sound recordings.so The defendant, a
competitor of the plaintiff, was alleged to have purchased the plaintiff's
audiobooks, repackaged and relabeled them as its own, and then distributed
them by rental, lease, and lending without authority from the plaintiff.s 1 The
plaintiff filed suit alleging, inter alia, copyright infringement based upon its
exclusive right to distribute.s 2 The defendant moved to dismiss the copyright
infringement claim arguing it was protected by the first sale doctrine.s 3 The
plaintiff argued audiobooks fell within the RRA exception and therefore the
defendant's renting, leasing, and lending of the audiobooks were not protected
under the first sale doctrine unless the plaintiff's consent was obtained.s4 The
district court held the RRA exception only applied to musical phonorecords,
not recorded literary works, and dismissed the plaintiff's claims. s
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit was presented with the question of whether
the RRA exception to the first sale doctrine applies to all phonorecords or only

76

See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. A.L.W., Ltd., 855 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1988).
Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Communications, Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 374
(6th Cir. 2007).
78
Id. at 368.
19 Id.
80 Id.
81
Id. at 369.
82
Id. The plaintiff also brought trademark infringement, unfair compet1t10n, and
trademark dilution claims. The district court dismissed these claims under trademark law's
application of the first sale doctrine, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded for
additional proceedings on these claims. Id. at 374. Because of the different purposes of
trademark and copyright law, application of the first sale doctrine in the trademark context is
not germane to the discussion of the first sale doctrine in the copyright context.
83
Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Communications, Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1236
(W.D. Mich. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, Brilliance Audio, Inc., 474 F.3d at 374.
84
Id. at 1240.
85
Id. at 1241.
77
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phonorecords of musical works. 86 The plaintiff sought a broad reading of the
RRA exception, which included all phonorecords. 87 Under this approach,
audiobooks would fall within the bounds of the RRA exception and others
would be prohibited from renting, leasing, or lending audiobooks without the
copyright owner's authority. The defendant, on the other hand, sought a
reading of the RRA exception, limiting it to musical phonorecords, thus
causing audiobooks to remain under the protection of the first sale doctrine and
outside the bounds of infringement. 88
A.

The Majority Opinion

The majority began its analysis by noting that it first must try to determine
Congress' intended meaning of the RRA exceJ'tion and to do this, it must first
look to the language of the statute itself. 8 The court acknowledged two
potential readings of the RRA exception.
The first potential reading was that "the statute applies only when a sound
recording has 'musical works embodied therein,"' because "[e]xtending the
exception to audiobooks would read the 'musical works' clause out of the
statute."90 In other words, the consent of the copyright owner of the musical
sound recordings is required as well as the consent of the copyright owner of
the underlying musical work. 91 Under this reading, only musical sound
recordings are encompassed by the RRA exception.
The second potential reading of the RRA exception was that "the statute
requires obtaining the permission of the owner of the copyright in the sound
recording regardless of whether the second permission-that of the copyright
in the underlying work-is needed." 92 In other words, "For a musical
recording, the second permission is necessary; for a recording of a literary
work, it is not.',93
The court found both readings to be plausible, thus creating an ambiguity
in the RRA exception. 94 Because the statutory text was not clear, the court
86

Brilliance Audio, Inc., 474 F.3d at 368.
Id. at 372.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94
Id. The Sixth Circuit is not alone in its belief that the statutory language is
ambiguous and there are two plausible interpretations. Professor Nimmer states:
Apparently, there is no legislative history relating to this issue, and the language of
Section 109(b)(l)(A) itself is ambiguous .... This may be read as requiring the consent
of only those copyright owners of sound recordings that in fact embody musical works
(as well as of the copyright owners of such musical works). Alternatively, it may be
read as requiring the consent of the copyright owners of all sound recordings, as well as
the consent of the copyright owners of any musical works that may be embodied
therein, but as not requiring the consent of the copyright owners of any literary or
dramatic works that may be embodied therein.
87
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noted it should look to other authority to discern its meaning. 95 The court's
reasoning was guided by the legislative history, the context in which the statue
was passed, and policy rationales. 96
The court recognized that when the RRA exception was adopted in 1984,
the exclusive focus was on protecting the music industry. 97 In support of this
argument, the court cited the Senate and House Report accompanying the RRA
exception which specifically referred to the dangers to recording companies,
music publishers, and songwriters. 98 The court further cited the House Report
accompanying the 1988 extension of the RRA exception. 99 This report stated
that the Register of Copyrights had questioned whether the RRA exception
applied only to musical works or whether it extended to recorded literary
works. 100 In response, the report concluded:
It is less likely ... that literary works invite the same kind of long-term,
repeated enjoyment by consumers. The problems addressed by the [RRA]
in 1984 do not relate to recorded literary works, nor did the testimony in
support of the legislation. In addition, during the 1988 hearings, no
specific problems regarding the rental of recorded literary works were
raised. The Committee concludes that if problems do arise, they may be
addressed when the new five year "sunset" provision expires. 101
Despite this legislative history suggesting a musical focus, the court
recognized that although "Congress intended to address concerns with musical
recordings, as opposed to non-musical recordings, is not necessarily
dispositive." 102 This is because Congress can write a statute to cover present
concerns, but also has the power to address unforeseeable future concerns. 103
Nonetheless, the court also reasoned that the RRA exception should be
construed narrowly because it upset the balance established in the first sale
doctrine. 104 When Congress passed the RRA exception, the court explained, it
made a specific policy choice that effectively altered the traditional copyright
bargain and extended the copyright monopoly. 105 Given the alteration to the
balance between copyright owners and personal property owners, the court
concluded that it would not broadly construe the RRA exception without an

NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B][7][c].
95
Brilliance Audio, Inc., 474 F.3d at 372 (describing other authority as including
"other statutes, interpretations by other courts, legislative history, policy rationales, and the
context in which the statute was passed").
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99
Id. at 373.
100
H.R. REP. No. 100-776, at 3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4339, 4341.
101
Id. See infra Part V.A.3. for criticism of this argument restricting the RRA
exception to musical sound recordings.
102
Brilliance Audio, Inc., 474 F.3d at 373.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105

Id. at 373-74.
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express statement from Congress to include non-musical phonorecords within
•
106
its scope.
B.

The Dissenting Opinion

Judge Cornelia Kennedy, in her dissenting opinion, 107 concluded the RRA
exception does apply to non-musical phonorecords. She interpreted the clause
"in the case of a sound recording in the musical works embodied therein" to
mean:
if a sound recording containing musical works is the object of the rental,
lease, or lending, then the person engaging in such activities can only
lawfully do so with the authorization of the owner of the copyright for
the sound recording and the owner of the copyright for the musical works
. d.m the sound record"mg. 108
contame
Because audiobooks were not musical sound recordings, Judge Kennedy
found this clause of the RRA exception ina~plicable and only the general
provision regarding sound recordings applied. 1
Judge Kennedy then addressed the majority's reliance on the RRA
exception's legislative history. First, citing the Supreme Court's recent
criticism of reliance upon legislative history, Judge Kennedy found it to be
murky, ambiguous, and contradictory. 110 Second, she found reliance upon
legislative history gave unrepresentative committee members or unelected
staffers and lobbyists the power "to attempt strategic manipulations of
legislative history to secure results they were unable to achieve through the
statutory text." 111 Judge Kennedy concluded that because she felt the text of the
RRA exception was clear, there was no reason to resort to the legislative
.
112
history.
C.

The Better-Reasoned Approach

The majority opinion in Brilliance Audio appears to be better reasoned, but
not necessarily correct. Although Judge Kennedy clearly believed the RRA
exception was unambiguous, she failed to address the majority's belief that the
RRA exception lent itself to two interpretations. Judge Kennedy merely
asserted that the plain reading of the text was the way she read it. She gave no
explanation as to why the other posited interpretation of the text was erroneous.
Although her apprehensiveness of relying on legislative history and other
indicia of Congressional intent may be well-founded, the basis for her

106

Id.

107

Judge Kennedy concurred with the majority's decision regarding the trademark
infringement claims, but dissented as to the copyright infringement issue.
108
Brilliance Audio, Inc., 474 F.3d at 375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
I09 Id.
iw Id. (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546 (2005)).
Ill

112

Id.
Id.
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interpretation of the statutory text is not articulated and provides no foundation
for reaching her ultimate conclusion.
On the other hand, the majority's approach at least attempted to explain
how the RRA exception could be read in two contrasting ways. However, the
majority's statement that reading the statute as including all phonorecords
113
would "read the 'musical works' clause out of the statute"
may be
exaggerated. As argued by the plaintiff and recognized by the court, the statute
could be read to apply to all phonorecords, causing the "musical works clause"
to require the consent of the copyright owner in the musical work if the sound
recording were a musical sound recording. 114 This interpretation does not read
the "musical works clause" out ofthe statute; it merely modifies the application
of the statute and does not necessarily create any internal inconsistencies.
Despite this overemphasis on reading the "musical works clause" out of the
statute, the majority opinion's approach is better-reasoned than the dissent,
although not necessarily the best reading of the RRA exception.
V. SHOULD THE RRA EXCEPTION BE LIMITED TO MUSICAL
PHONORECORDS?
Notwithstanding the decision in Brilliance Audio and this Article's post
decision observation, there exists a possibility that other circuits confronted
with this same question could come to a different result. Just as one third of the
judges in Brilliance Audio interpreted the RRA exception differently, it is not
unimaginable that a different panel ofjudges could have decided two to one the
other way. For this reason, a normative look at whether the RRA exception
should apply to non-musical sound recordings is appropriate. This question is
not whether the Sixth Circuit correctly interpreted the RRA exception. Rather,
the question is whether the RRA exception should be amended to include non
musical phonorecords within its purview.
The question can be analyzed and critiqued through three different lenses.
First, the scope of the RRA exception can be viewed through a legislative
history lens to see if the rationales underlying the exception applied equally to
non-musical sound recordings as they did to musical sound recordings.
Likewise, the legislative history should be examined for support that the RRA
exception does apply to non-musical sound recordings. In addition, the RRA
exception's legislative history distinguishing musical from non-musical
phonorecords should be scrutinized.
Second, the scope of the RRA exception can be viewed through a
contemporaneous lens. Under this lens, one should look to see if today's
market for and threats to non-musical phonorecords is congruent to those posed
to the music industry in 1984.
Third, the scope of the RRA exception can be viewed through a
prospective lens to see what the future may hold for both musical and non
musical phonorecords, whether there is any justification for treating them
113
114

Brilliance Audio, Inc., 474 F.3d at 372.
Id.
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differently, and whether an entirely new approach to the rental-market is
warranted. Each of these approaches is explored infra.
A.

The Legislative History Lens

The first approach to determine whether the RRA exception should apply
to non-musical phonorecords is to view the questions through a legislative
history lens. The legislative history presents three questions. First, did the
legislative history's stated rationales underlying the exception apply equally to
non-musical and musical phonorecords? Second, does the legislative history
provide any support that the RRA applies to non-musical phonorecords? Third,
does the legislative history distinguishing musical phonorecords from non
musical phonorecords make sense?
1. Underlying Rationales
Three underlying rationales for the RRA exception stand out. First, the
legislative history concluded "that the nexus of commercial record rental and
duplication may directly and adversely affect the ability of copyright holders to
exercise their reproduction and distribution rights under the copyright act." 115
This rationale merely concludes that if there are easy ways to infringe and
renting helps the infringers accomplish their goal, then copyright owners will
have difficulty enforcing their exclusive rights. This rationale applies equally
well to non-musical phonorecords. Copying non-musical phonorecords in the
1980s was just as easy as copying musical phonorecords. If someone rented
non-musical phonographs, then this would, just as in the musical phonorecord
context, help the infringing consumers accomplish their presumed goal of
copying the phonorecord. Thus, the copyright owners of non-musical sound
recordings would be just as deprived of enforcing their exclusive rights to
distribute and reproduce. Therefore, this rationale provides no basis for
restricting the RRA exception to musical phonorecords.
The second rationale included in the legislative history is that sales of CDs
were increasing, they were relatively indestructible, and their reproductions
were of high quality. 116 This rationale applies equally to non-musical
phonorecords. CDs containing non-musical sound recordings were just as
indestructible and their reproductions were of equally high quality. There does
not appear to be any data suggesting that the sales of CDs in the non-musical
market were any different from the musical market. This rationale also
provides no basis for restricting the RRA exception to musical phonorecords.
The third rationale included in the legislative history is that blank tapes
were sold in the same establishment where phonorecords were rented. 117 There
is no legislative history commenting one way or the other about non-musical
phonorecords being rented at record rental stores: With respect to blank tapes
being sold, it might have been that blank tapes were not sold in the same stores
115

H.R. REP. No. 98-987, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2899;
H.R. REP. No. 100-776, at 3-4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4339, 4341.
116
H.R. REP. No. 100-776, at 2, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4339, 4340.
117
H.R. REP. No. 98-987, at 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2899.
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where non-musical phonorecords were rented. However, the relatively cheap
nature of blank tapes would not have made it difficult to copy the non-musical
phonorecord. On the other hand, there may be merit to the fact that non
musical phonorecords, such as audiobooks or stand-up comedy albums, were
not rented at these two hundred stores. The legislative history is simply silent
on these issues.
As a whole, the rationales contained in the legislative history provide little,
if any, support for distinguishing musical from non-musical phonorecords. As a
result, there is little, if any, reason for limiting the RRA exception only to
musical phonorecords.
2. Support for Extension to Non-Musical Phonographs
There is some legislative history supporting the notion that the RRA
exception applies to non-musical phonorecords. The 1984 House Report notes
that "the terms 'sound recording' and 'phonorecord' are intended to have the
same meaning as defined in section 101 of the Copyright Act. [The RRA
exception] thus does not apply to the music or other sounds accompanying a
motion picture or other audiovisual work." 118 The reference to "other sounds"
in this context suggests the RRA exception was intended to apply to non
musical sound recordings embodied in phonorecords. If the RRA exception
only applied to musical sound recordings, then there would be no need to refer
to the "other sounds" being excluded when they are associated with audiovisual
works.
The Sixth Circuit in Brilliance Audio stated that this legislative
commentary was intended to clarify that the RRA exception did not apply to
motion pictures. 119 This is doubtful. The House Report speaks in terms of
"music or other sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual
work." 120 The focus of that sentence is the music and sounds, not the motion
picture or other audiovisual work. If Congress meant what the Sixth Circuit
believes, it could have simply said the RRA exception "does not apply to
motion pictures or other audiovisual works." The Sixth Circuit's
misunderstanding should not mislead those considering whether the RRA
exception should apply to non-musical phonorecords.
Admittedly, the legislative history is sparse with respect to non-musical
phonorecords. However, the statement that the phrases "sound recording" and
"phonorecord" are to maintain their meaning as defined in the Copyright Act
speaks volumes about the RRA exception's intended applicability. Although
the record industry bore the brunt of the lobbying efforts, as the Sixth Circuit
pointed out in Brilliance Audio, Congress could have legislatively addressed
issues beyond those brought to its attention by a specific lobby. 121 In other
words, it is not just the squeaky wheel that may get the Congressional grease.

118
119
120
121

Id. at 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2901 (emphasis added).
Brilliance Audio, Inc., 4 74 F.3d at 373.
H.R. REP. No. 98-987, at 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2901.
Brilliance Audio, Inc., 4 74 F.3d at 373.
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3. The Sensibility ofthe Stated Distinguishing Feature
The last item to consider under the legislative history lens is the specific
argument set forth in the 1988 House Report finding the RRA exception did
not apply to non-musical phonorecords. When the RRA exception was up for
renewal, the Register of Copyrights inquired as to whether it extended to
recorded literary works. 122 The Report concludes that the RRA exception did
not extend to recorded literary works because "[i]t is less likely ... that litera~
works invite the same kind of long-term, repeated enjoyment by consumers." 1 3
In other words, the Report found the feature causing musical and non-musical
works to be treated differently under the RRA exception was that consumers
repeatedly listen to musical works, whereas they only listen to non-musical
124
works once.
This argument makes no sense. The problem faced by the record industry
was that because consumers could rent phonorecords, the record industry was
being deprived of the opportunity to sell phonorecords to those consumers. The
record industry was not concerned that consumers were listening to the
phonorecords repeatedly; it was concerned they were not purchasing new
phonorecords, which resulted in lower sales for the record industry.
For example, in the musical context, the consumer would rent the CD,
probably copy it, and listen to it multiple times. The consumer never purchased
the CD. Therefore, the record industry was only selling one CD (to the record
store), rather than selling multiple CDs (one to each consumer who rented).
The record industry has little incentive or practical recourse to stop consumers
from listening to copied albums on multiple occasions. On the other hand, it
has a great incentive to stop the rental market completely. Killing this market
125
causes those consumers who were renting CDs to now purchase the same.
This increase in sales results in additional profits for the record company.
In the non-musical context, the consumer would rent an audiobook, listen
to it, may or may not copy it or ever listen to it again. Regardless of how often
the consumer listens to the audiobook, the consumer never purchases it. Just as
in the musical context, the audiobook manufacturer only sells one audiobook
(to the record store) rather than multiple audiobooks (one to each consumer
who rented). It does not matter whether the consumer wants to listen to the
audiobook multiple times or only once.
The problem, as far as the record company or audiobook manufacturer is
concerned, is that the CD or audiobook is available for rent. The rental is what
inhibits sales and profits. Therefore, the legislative history's distinction
between musical and non-musical phonorecords is really a distinction without a
difference.

122
123
124

H.R. REP. No. 100-776, at 3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4339, 4341.
Id.

This argument has also been made by commentators predicting whether the RRA
exception applies to non-musical phonorecords. See NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8. l 2[B][7][ c ].
125
Presumably not every rental consumer would become a purchasing consumer as
there is some elasticity for musical phonorecords.
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Notwithstanding the irrelevance of the multiple listening argument, it is
also not necessarily the case that consumers only listen to non-musical sound
recordings one time. It is not uncommon for consumers of stand-up comedy
sound recordings to listen to the routines several times. Thus, the factual basis
for this distinction is suspect. 126 For these reasons, this piece of legislative
history should not be relied upon in determining whether the RRA exception
should apply to non-musical phonorecords.
B.

The Contemporaneous Lens

The second approach to determine whether the RRA exception should
apply to non-musical phonorecords is to view the question through a
contemporaneous lens to see how the non-musical phonorecord industry
compares to the musical phonorecord industry of 1984. Depending on the
similarities shared between these industries, an extension of the RRA exception
to non-musical phonorecords might be warranted.
In the early 1980s, there were approximately 200 rental stores throughout
the United States renting musical phonorecords for twenty-four to seventy-two
hour periods for fees ranging from 99¢ to $2.50 per phonorecord. 127 Moreover,
the stores also sold blank audio cassette tapes at the same time. 128 Also, it
should be remembered that Congress passed the RRA exception despite its
recognition that the number of record rental retailers was relatively small,
because the development of inexpensive audio taping equipment and CDs gave
the commercial rental of phonorecords the prospects of a viable business
venture. 129
Today's non-musical phonorecord rental market is quite extensive. Several
online rental establishments exist for audiobooks. 130 These online audiobook
rental establishments offer various pricing options, including monthly or annual

126
See also NIMMER, supra note 13, § 8.12[B][7][c] n.138 (noting that the underlying
assumption for this reasoning is open to serious question).
127
See supra notes 56--59 and accompanying text.
12s Id.
129
H.R. REP. No. 98-987, at 2 n.6 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 2899
n.6.
130
See,
e.g.,
Booksfree.com,
http://www.booksfree.com;
Audiobooks.com,
http://www.audiobooks.com; Simply Audiobooks, http://www.simplyaudiobooks.com; On
the
Go
Books,
http://www.onthegobooks.com;
Recorded
Books,
LLC,
http://www.recordedbooks.com; Audio Diversions, http://www.audiodiversions.com.
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subscriptions, permitting the customer to unlimited rentals, 131 or renting per
audiobook. 132
Beyond the online establishments, physical rental markets also exist. For
example, Cracker Barrel Old Country Store with 553 company-owned units in
forty-one states 133 offers its customers a selection of over 200 audiobook titles
at every location. 134 These audiobooks can be purchased at any location and
can be returned for the purchase price minus a $3.49 per week charge. 135 In
comparison to the 99¢ to $2.50 rental fees for one to three days of use in the
early 1980s, a one week rental for $3.49 is proportionally cheaper. 136
The Cracker Barrel Old Country Store rental program alone is already
more widespread than the threat of 200 rental establishments facing the music
industry in the early 1980s. The online rental establishments pose an increased
risk over physical locations because of their ability to easily transact business
with consumers throughout the country (and the world). In fact, one of the
major limitations on rental establishments in the early 1980s was that their
consumers were generally from a local geographic range. The presence of an
online rental market for non-musical phonorecords extinguishes this limitation.
The combination of physical and online rental establishments demonstrates that
the rental market facing non-musical phonorecords is more developed and
extensive than that facing the music industry in the early 1980s when the RRA
exception was adopted.
Another concern in the early 1980s was that blank audio cassette tapes
were fairly cheap and facilitated copying. 137 Today, blank CDs can be
purchased at any electronics retailer for a negligible cost (less than 30¢ per
CD). Again, today's low cost of blank media is similar to, if not cheaper than,
the blank audio cassettes of the early 1980s. This too shows the similarities
between the musical phonorecord rental market of the early 1980s, when the
RRA exception was enacted, and the non-musical phonorecord rental market of
today.
131

See, e.g., Booksfree.com, Available Membership Plans, http://www.booksfree.com/
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This, of course, ignores the time value of money issue, which further strengthens the
argument that today's rental rates are equal to or less than those in the early 1980s.
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Again, it is important to remember that in the earl~ 1980s, Congress was
concerned with the prospects of a viable rental market. 1 8 Today's non-musical
phonorecord rental market is more than a prospect-it is a reality. The market
is more extensive and less expensive than what faced the music industry in the
early 1980s and the media for copying these works is comparable. The music
industry appears pleased (or at least not displeased) with the additional
protection the RRA exception granted and the success it had at eliminating
phonorecord rentals. There have been no efforts on the music industry's part to
repeal the RRA exception. Presumably, the non-musical phonorecord industry
would be equally pleased with the same results (i.e. fewer rentals, increased
sales, and increased profits).
Looking at the RRA exception through a contemporaneous lens
demonstrates that the problems faced by the industries during their respective
time periods are sufficiently similar. Thus, the contemporaneous lens suggests
and provides strong support for Congress amending the RRA exception to
include non-musical phonorecords.
C.

The Prospective Lens

The third approach to determine whether the RRA exception should apply
to non-musical phonorecords is to view the question through a prospective lens
to see what the future may hold for both musical and non-musical sound
recordings and whether there is any justification for treating them differently
under the RRA exception. This section will initially explore the impact of
downloadable media upon the first sale doctrine and RRA exception. Because
of the changing technological and legal landscapes, an entirely new approach to
rental markets is suggested. Lastly, this section analyzes the future of non
downloadable phonorecords to determine whether different treatment of
musical and non-musical phonorecords is warranted.
1. The Future Concerning Downloadable Sound Recordings
Downloading audiobooks and music has been on the rise. The audiobook
sector showing the most growth was downloadable sales. 139 Downloads
accounted for 6% of sales of audiobooks in 2004, but increased to 9% in
2005. 140 The same appears true for musical sound recordings. In the music
industry, the percentage of sales via digital download increased from 0.2% in
2001 to 5.7% in 2005. 141 Although these rises were concerned with sales, not
rentals, it does not seem unreasonable that audiobook rentals could follow the
same course if a downloadable rental market were created (e.g. the ability to
rent MP3s). As of today, there do not appear to be any downloadable rentals for
138

See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
Audio Publishers Association, Audio Publishers Association (APA) Fact Sheet
(2005), http://www.audiopub.org/files/public/APA_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
140
Audio Publishers Association, Audio Publishing Industry Continues to Grow;
Shows 4. 7% Increase in Sales, at 2, http://www.audiopub.org/files/public/
APASalesSurveyResultsFactSheet2006COMPLETE.pdf.
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Recording Industry Association of America, 2005 Consumer Profile,
http://www.riaa.com (follow "Consumer Trends" hyperlink; then follow "2005" hyperlink).
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audiobooks, but that could change if an entrepreneurial audiobook listener
thought there was a market.
If a download rental market were created, then the music, audiobook, and
stand-up comedy industries would not necessarily be concerned for two
reasons. The first reason is the use of digital rights management ("ORM").
ORM refers collectively to technologies used by copyright owners to control
access to and usage of digital media in an effort to enforce copyrights and
prevent infringement. 142 Using ORM, a copyright owner can encode each
electronic work with an array of "technological fences" to control the work's
subsequent use. 143 An example of ORM is Apple's iTunes, which encodes
songs to prevent consumers from posting them online in a readable format for
others to listen to. 144 This, to a certain extent, prevents unlawful copying and
distribution. ORM could also be utilized in the download rental market to
restrict or prevent copying and to self-terminate after the rental period expires.
The second reason the music, audiobook, and stand-up comedy industries
would not necessarily be concerned with download rental markets is because
there currently is no digital first sale doctrine. It must be remembered that the
Copyright Act's first sale doctrine is only applicable to owners of particular
copies or phonorecords and copies, and phonorecords are material objects. 145 A
downloaded file, such as an MP3, is not itself a material object. 146 Once the file
is burned to a CD, then the CD becomes a phonorecord, but the file itself does
not constitute a material object. As such, a renter of downloadable music or
audiobooks would not be protected by the first sale doctrine.
Nonetheless, there is a real possibility that Congress could change the
Copyright Act to create a digital first sale doctrine that would grant consumers
of downloaded music, audiobooks, or comedy routines the right to resell and
rent these files. In 2001, the Copyright Office, as requested by Congress when
it enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), prepared a report
addressing the relationship between existing and emergent technology, and
section 109 of the Copyright Act. 147 In its report, the Copyright Office did not
recommend amending the Copyright Act to expand the first sale doctrine to
digital transmissions of copyrighted works. 148 Proponents of a digital first sale
doctrine drew an analogy between transmitting digital works and circulating
goods in the physical realm, but this analogy was rejected by the Copyright
Office because it ultimately relied upon either a voluntary or automatic deletion
142
Justin Graham, Preserving the Aftermarket in Copyrighted Works: Adapting the
First Sale Doctrine to the Emerging Technological Landscape, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1,
29 (2002).
143 Id.
144
Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music, Feb. 6, 2007, http://www.apple.com/hotnews/
thoughtsonmusic.
145
17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
146
See Brian Mencher, Digital Transmissions: To Boldly Go Where No First Sale
Doctrine Has Gone Before, 10 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 47, 63 (2002).
147
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT (2001), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol- l .pdf.
148
Id. at 80.
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of the file, both of which were unworkable at the time. 149 However, the report
acknowledged that changes could occur in the market that may invite Congress
150
to revisit the issue.
As discussed, supra, the technological landscape has
changed substantially since 2001, with ORM now becoming standard in the
151
online music industry.
The notion of ORM being unworkable is, and will
continue to be, outdated. As stated by one commentator, ORM "is the wave of
the present and the future." 152 Therefore, it is not unlikely that Congress may
revisit the issue of creating a digital first sale doctrine that includes, not only
copies and phonorecords, but also extends to non-tangible files that can be
transferred without the need of a physical and tangible embodiment.
If Congress created a digital first sale doctrine, but failed to amend the
RRA exception, then the music and audiobook industries would face a major
problem-the RRA exception would not apply to these digital files. Again,
there would be no material object for the sound recording, and thus no
phonorecord to protect under the RRA exception.
With the legal protection gone, the music, audiobook, and stand-up
comedy industries are only left with ORM to protect their copyrights. And
although this may very well be sufficient, 153 it has been noted that ORM is a
cat-and-mouse game where hackers successfully discover methods to work
around the ORM and the copyright owners must employ new technologies to
stay ahead of the game. 154 Moreover, there is a movement underway to sell
digital sound recordings that are free of ORM technology. 155 Given these
potential struggles facing the industries, is there an alterative solution
benefiting both the industries and consumers?
One approach is for the industries to promote licensing, rather than sales,
of musical and non-musical sound recordings, because the first sale doctrine
does not apply to licensed phonorecords. 156 As suggested by one commentator,
consumers will likely prefer to license sound recordings if they can be assured
that technological advances will not leave them with outdated media. 157
The argument is as follows. As technology advances, most digital files
will become obsolete to the consumer within approximately five years. 158 The
industries can provide up-to-date sound recording files and offer consumers an

149
150
151
152
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Id. at 100.
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Graham, supra note 142, at 29.
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option between purchasing and licensing the file. 159 If the consumer purchases
the file, the consumer alone is responsible for any losses, deletions, or
160
corruptions that occur. The purchasing consumer would also be permitted to
161
sell, rent, or otherwise dispose of the file pursuant to the first sale doctrine.
Over time, the purchased file will become obsolete and increasingly unusable,
162
forcing the consumer to purchase an updated version of the sound recording.
On the other hand, if the consumer opted to license the sound recording,
their rights could be limited to the specific rights granted by the industries
163
under the license agreement.
And while the consumers would not own a
copy of the file, they would be given additional benefits, including the right to
access multiple file formats and replacement for lost, deleted, or corrupted
files. 164 Keeping the costs of licensing below the costs of ~urchasing should
lead consumers away from purchasing and towards licensing. 65
In this scenario everyone wins. The consumers have the option of
choosing which rights best suit them, but will more likely choose the licensing
option given the cheaper price and additional benefits. For the industries, two
benefits inure. First, a stream of income would result for each sound recordinJg
1
licensed and for any fees involved with updating or replacing licensed files.
Second, the number of purchasers of sound recording files, as opposed to
licensees, would decline, thus reducing the number of individuals able to assert
167
the first sale doctrine defense.
Therefore, if we look towards the future of music and audiobooks, we can
see that although the problem facing the music and audiobook industry is not
an immediate threat, there is a practical, technological, and mutually agreeable
way to avoid the potential problem.
2. The Future ofTraditional Phonorecord Rentals
Notwithstanding the shift to non-phonorecord downloadable media, there
still exists a phonorecord market for musical and non-musical works. The Sixth
Circuit's decision in Brilliance Audio provides an incentive to those wishing to
enter the non-musical phonorecord rental market. As of now, they are free to
rent non-musical phonorecords under the first sale doctrine without fear of
infringement claims based on the RRA exception. As explained, supra, the
rental market facing audiobook publishers is more extensive than what the
music industry faced in the early 1980s. 168 Although the uncertainty of the
RRA exception's applicability to non-musical phonorecords may have
previously caused those considering entering the rental market to pause or
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
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abstain, this anxiety-causing hurdle has been removed and exacerbates the
problem facing the audiobook industry to levels well beyond what faced the
music industry in the early 1980s. Therefore, even if ORM is successful and
Congress refuses to expand the first sale doctrine to digital, non-tangible
formats, viewing this problem under the prospective lens still suggests
amending the RRA exception to expressly include non-musical phonorecords.
VI. SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT

After looking at the issue through these three different lenses, it seems that
Congress should amend the RRA exception to include non-musical
phonorecords within its ambit. The legislative history lens suggests the
underlying rationales for the RRA exception apply almost equally to non
musical phonorecords as it did to musical phonorecords. 169 Moreover, there is
legislative history suggesting expansion and the legislative history's argument
for distinguishing these phonorecords makes no sense. 170 Likewise, the
contemporaneous and prospective lenses also promote expanding the RRA
exception's scope to non-musical phonorecords. The contemporaneous lens
shows the threat of rental markets facing the non-musical sound recordin.fi
industry is more extreme than that facing the music industry in the 1980s. 1
The prospective lens demonstrates that the current state of the law and possible
development will only fuel this rental market growth. 172
Even if Congress chooses not to expand the scope of the RRA exception,
it should be amended nonetheless. As it stands now, it is poorly drafted. To
avoid a future split in the circuits and to further advise audiobook publishers,
authors and stand-up comics who record their works, and consumers about
their rights with respect to the rental market of phonorecords, Congress should
amend the RRA exception. Two options are provided, infra, depending on
which option Congress chooses.
A.

Expanding the Scope ofSound Recordings

If Congress determines the scope of the RRA exception should be
expanded to include all phonorecords, consistent with the Sixth Circuit's
dissent in Brilliance Audio, then the following amendment to the first sentence
of section 109(b)(1 )(A) should be made:

Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), unless authorized by
the owners of copyright in the sound recording, and if a musical sound
recording then the owners of copyright in the musical works embodied
therein, or the owner ofcopyright in a computer program (including any
tape, disk, or other medium embodying such program), neither the owner
of a particular phonorecord nor any person in possession of a particular
copy of a computer program (including any tape, disk, or other medium
169
170
171

172
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embodying such program), may, for the purposes of direct or indirect
commercial advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the
possession of that phonorecord or computer program (including any tape,
disk, or other medium embodying such program) by rental, lease, or
lending, or by any other act or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or
. 173
len d mg.
This amendment moves the clause referring to "the owners of copyright in
the musical works embodied therein" so it follows the clause referring to
musical sound recordings. The splicing of the two clauses referring to sound
recordings in the current version of the RRA 174 and inserting a reference to
computer programs between them adds confusion to this already-disoriented
statute. In addition, this amendment adds a clause clarifying that consent of the
copyright owner of the musical works is only necessary if the sound recording
is a musical sound recording. Otherwise, only the consent of the copyright
owner of the sound recording is necessary. The use of the if/then language of
this clause leaves open the option that sound recordings other than musical
sound recordings are encompassed by the RRA exception.
B.

Limiting Sound Recordings to Musical Works

If Congress determines the scope of the RRA exception should be limited
to musical phonorecords, consistent with the majority's decision in Brilliance
Audio, then the following amendment to the first sentence of section
109(b)(1 )(A) should be made:

Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), unless authorized by
the owners of copyright in the musical sound recording and the owners
of copyright in the musical works embodied therein, or the owner of
copyright in a computer program (including any tape, disk, or other
medium embodying such program), neither the owner of a particular
musical phonorecord nor any person in possession of a particular copy of
a computer program (including any tape, disk, or other medium
embodying such program), may, for the purposes of direct or indirect
commercial advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the
possession of that phonorecord or computer program (including any tape,
disk, or other medium embodying such program) by rental, lease, or
lending, or by any other act or practice in the nature of rental, lease, or
. 175
len d mg.
This amendment adds the modifier "musical" before "sound recording"
and "phonorecord" to limit the scope. Moreover, this amendment, like the
amendment expanding the RRA exception's scope, moves the clause referring
to "the owners of copyright in the musical works embodied therein" so it
176
follows the clause referring to musical sound recordings. As discussed supra,

173
174
175
176
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the splicing of the two clauses and inserting the reference to computer
programs between them causes more confusion than already exists. 177
VIL CONCLUSION

For over twenty years, the courts have not had an opportunity to determine
whether the RRA exception applies to non-musical phonorecords. Surprisingly,
this poorly phrased statute had largely managed to escape judicial attention.
However, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Brilliance Audio finally answered this
lingering question.
Given the historical background of the first sale doctrine and the RRA
exception, it may be that the Sixth Circuit decided the issue correctly. This
Article does not take issue with the court's conclusion, but instead uses the
differing conclusions of the majority and dissent to illustrate that the RRA
exception is in need of Congressional clarification.
Congress, standing at the crossroads between these interpretations, has the
power to clarify the scope of the RRA and direct the courts and the public as to
what are and are not protected activities under the Copyright Act. By viewing
the issue through three different lenses, Congress should see that expanding the
scope of the RRA exception to include non-musical phonorecords is justified.
178
If it agrees, a proposed amendment to the RRA exception is detailed, supra.
However, there is also support for limiting the RRA exception in the way set
forth by the Sixth Circuit's majority in Brilliance Audio. If Congress
determines the RRA exception should remain limited in scope, then a proposed
amendment to the RRA is also detailed, supra. 179 Regardless of Congress'
ultimate decision on how to amend the RRA exception, it is without doubt that
this statute needs Congressional attention. The existence and recent and
potential growth of an audiobook rental market will only be increased by the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Brilliance Audio, thus inviting future uncertainty
and a potential split amongst the circuits on the issue. A minor amendment to
the RRA exception can save the courts, the audiobook and comedy industries,
and consumers from wasting time and money further litigating this issue.
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178
179
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